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The European Union has taken a leading role in the process of transformation of the 
energy sector for the transition to a low carbon economy. This has created several 
opportunities and challenges for policymakers and businesses operating in the 
energy sector as new directives and regulations are developed and implemented. To 
improve our understanding on the nature of these emerging challenges a workshop 
was organised in Barcelona on February 3rd 2015, which saw the participation of 
eminent energy researchers from across the European academia. This introduction 
to the special issues provides some reflection about the challenging issues being 
tackled by the European Commission and individual Members States. The second 
section summarises the articles from the workshop, which make up this special issue 
and which provide insightful evidence, commentary and policy recommendations for 
a successful and efficient transformation to a low carbon European energy system.  
 
1. Emerging challenges for business and regulators in European energy 
markets 
 
Recent developments in global energy markets have generated opportunities and 
challenges for businesses and policymakers due to the rapid increase in energy 
demand from emerging and developing countries, geopolitical instability in different 
parts of the world, and most importantly the growing concerns about the impact of 
climate change on the quality of human and natural life, leading several countries to 
engage in decarbonisation policies and actions. The policy makers in the European 
Union have attempted to tackle such challenges over time through a series of 
legislative and regulatory interventions in the areas of climate and energy policy. 
While the development of the European economic integration has had energy policy 
as one of its main pillars since its inception in the 1950s, starting from the 1990s 
energy markets in Europe have been shaped by both national and supra-national 
(EU) policies simultaneously pursuing the objective of creating an internal energy 
market subject to competitive forces but with limited coordination across Member 
States. This has led to the creation of energy only markets with different 
characteristics and regulatory frameworks across Europe (Marty, 2014). The 
European Union has for many years played a leading role in the process of 
liberalisation of the energy sector through a series of legislative and regulatory 
interventions aimed at promoting the creation of an internal energy market through a 
process of privatisation, liberalisation and integration across national energy markets.  
In recent years however, the additional policy objectives of decarbonisation and 
security of supply have dramatically transformed the energy sector across Europe 
leading to increased penetration of renewable technologies; a transformation that 
has created challenges for the different European energy systems, characterised by 
the presence of energy only markets, as a result of deregulation policies promote by 
successive EU energy directives. The creation of energy-only markets in Europe can 
be ascribed at least in part to a general mistrust of long term contracts, due to the 
potential risk of abuse of market power and market foreclosure which have been 
associated with them in the academic literature and in the practice of competition 
policy (see de Hautecloque, 2009 and Motta, 2004). However the recent radical 
transformations of the European energy system have led to questions about the 
suitability of energy-only markets to provide reliable and affordable energy in the 
presence of increasing penetration of generation from intermittent and renewable 
sources (Henriot et al., 2013). As a result of this transformation the provision of 
balancing and flexibility services has become increasingly important with significant 
economic effects on final consumers’ energy bills (e.g. see Huber et al., 2014). 
Furthermore the introduction of carbon prices has altered the fuel mix for electricity 
generation, indirectly affecting the gas prices observed in European markets, as 
discussed in some of the contributions to the special issue summarised below. 
The pursuit of decarbonisation objectives and the ensuing increased penetration of 
generation from renewable sources have had important consequences also in terms 
of the need to extend, reinforce and further integrate the European electricity 
networks in order to address the increasing needs for flexibility and reserve services. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of policy objectives of security of supply has become more 
prevalent in the gas industry in recent years (e.g. see Westphal, 2014). The recent 
investment in the European gas networks and transportation systems has been 
dictated by the need to address security of supply problems in gas markets as a 
precautionary measure against re-emerging geopolitical instability and changes in 
the trade flows following the Fukushima accident and the boom of shale gas 
production in the US.  
As a consequence of the repositioning of European energy policy which has moved 
beyond the objectives of liberalisation and market integration towards an extended 
list of objective, including security of supply and decarbonisation, the implementation 
of energy policy measures by regulators and businesses has become more complex 
and challenging, and has led to potential conflicts between objectives, with costly 
consequences for energy users and taxpayers. The cost effectiveness of 
decarbonisation and energy policy measures is becoming an increasingly important 
criterion of policy evaluation as the affordability of energy bills is a prominent thought 
in the European taxpayers’ and voters’ minds, while fuel poverty is becoming a 
growing social concern. However the implementation of energy and climate policies 
has not always been pursued in a cost effective manner, in part as a result of a lack 
of coordination across different the Member States or due to different authorities 
devising and implementing policy measures in different climate and energy related 
sectors.   
The workshop on Energy Markets and Sustainability was organised at University of 
Barcelona with the aim of investigating the challenges facing European countries in 
their attempts to develop policies which promote the development of efficient, 
resilient and sustainable energy markets. 
2. Overview of the contributions to the special issue 
The papers in this special issue discuss the complex interaction between industry, 
markets, regulators and policy makers who are involved in enacting the transition to 
low carbon energy systems. The electricity sector in particular is facing considerable 
challenges as the industry where the most intense activity is taking place, with the 
aim of addressing decarbonisation objectives. This has resulted in sustained 
technological change and policy interventions in the form of market reform and 
Government support to emerging renewable technologies.      
2.1 Missing Markets 
Newbery (2016) discusses the role of missing money and missing market problems 
in relation to the reliability and adequacy issues currently faced in the European 
energy-only markets. The paper argues that the biases towards over-procurement of 
capacity in existing capacity mechanisms can exacerbate the missing money 
problems associated with energy-only markets, partly as a result of ignoring missing 
market problems, such as the lack of relatively long term future markets. More 
specifically the paper assesses the outcome of the first capacity auction in the UK 
and its ability to address the market failures associated with energy-only markets 
which are becoming prevalent in Europe following the implementation of the Third 
Energy package.  
The author also discusses the relationship between capacity mechanisms and cross-
border trading, reaching the conclusion that in order to address the reliability 
problems associated with the increased penetration of generation from renewable 
sources, the EU Target Electricity Market (TEM) should be operate on the basis of 
true scarcity prices, but also rely on bilateral agreements between system operators 
regarding the actions to be taken at stress events. The market design of the 
European TEM was based on the set up of the Scandinavian energy-only market 
Nord Pool, which has not experienced capacity adequacy issues despite the fact that 
it does not rely on capacity payment mechanisms. In line with this assessment of the 
main features of European electricity market, the author therefore argues that, in the 
presence of reliable price signals guiding cross-border trading and in the absence 
direct policy interventions, the implementation of a common capacity market would 
not be required in order to deal with reliability issues at the European level, so that 
different Member States would be able to independently develop their own capacity 
market design, on the basis of the experience of recently developed capacity 
markets. 
2.2 Empirical Assessment of Market Liberalization and RES integration 
The next three contributions rely on recent empirical evidence and data analysis to 
assess the impacts of energy market liberalisation and integration of high levels of 
generation from intermittent renewable sources in electricity systems. Two of these 
contributions provide estimates of the costs associated with such integration while 
the third one assesses the balancing costs associated with the introduction of retail 
market competition.  
 
The role of balancing markets has become increasing critical for the reliability of 
power systems characterised by high levels of penetration of generation from 
renewable sources. The contribution Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute (2016) 
attempts to assess the contrasting effects of the increased penetration of renewables 
on retail electricity pricing. While the cost of subsidizing renewable technologies is 
reflected directly in final energy bills the low marginal cost of energy from this 
sources has led to a reduction in wholesale prices. At the same time the volatility and 
intermittency of supply form renewable sources has caused an increase in the cost 
of ancillary and balancing services which has contributed to increasing energy bills 
for final consumers. The authors of this paper contribute to the debate about the 
implications of increasing renewable penetration by providing empirical evidence 
about the effect of renewables integration on balancing requirements and costs in 
the Spanish electricity market. The Spanish case is particularly significant as Spain 
has levels of installed capacity of renewable energy among the highest in Europe 
and one of the highest levels of penetration of wind and solar percentage of total 
energy supply from renewables in the European Union. Furthermore Spain is 
characteristic by a relatively interconnection with neighbouring countries, which 
makes the challenges of ensuring a reliable and adequate electricity supply more 
difficult to meet in the presence of high levels of variable generation from renewable 
sources. However the authors also point out the effect of increased renewable 
energy penetration depends on the state of the system so that it would be difficult 
generalise their impact on the demand for ancillary services across different 
timescales and systems. The empirical analysis of the recent changes in balancing 
costs in the Spanish electricity markets leads the authors to conclude that both 
uncertainty and variability in supply have a positive effect on adjustment costs. They 
also argue that the availability of flexible plant is more critical in countries with limited 
interconnection such as Spain in order to limit the adjustment costs associated with 
intermittent generation.  
 
Recent changes in balancing requirements which have emerged as a result of 
regulatory interventions in Spain are also the focus of the contribution by Batalla-
Bejerano, Costa-Campi  and Trujillo-Baute (2016), who investigate the impact of the 
retail market liberalisation in 2009 on the costs of Spanish electricity system and, as 
a consequence, on final consumers prices. The authors argue that the transposition 
of the second EU energy directive into national regulation with the objective of 
promoting competition in the retail market had generated unexpected effects in other 
parts of the Spanish energy system, causing an increase in balancing costs.  By 
analysing the cost of volume adjustments before and after the 2009 market reform 
the authors are able to estimate the impact on final consumer bills of the additional 
costs associated with the balancing requirement induced by deviations of demand 
from predicted volumes. The authors identify significant changes in the balancing 
requirements of the Spanish energy system as a result of the transition to a 
competitive retail market due to the change in the role of the local distribution system 
operators. The new balancing requirements have arisen from the limited ability of 
energy suppliers to produce reliable estimates for final demand on the basis of a 
limited amount of metered data, which makes it more likely that differences between 
estimated and actual demand will be observed. According to the authors’ estimates 
balancing requirements in the Spanish electricity system saw increases in excess of 
30% in the year after the market reform. This was translated into an increase of 
around 0.3 euros/MWh in final electricity bills. The authors recognise that widely 
adopted smart meters would mitigate the balancing requirements associated with 
deviations of actual from forecast demand, however their main policy 
recommendation is that these additional balancing costs should be borne by 
suppliers or by the regulator, rather than by consumers, in order to give suppliers 
adequate incentives to mitigate the additional flexibility requirements. The general 
issue of increased balancing requirements arising from market liberalisation 
discussed in this paper for the Spanish case is not an exception, but rather applies 
also to other European countries which have developed similar market designs as a 
result of the transposition of EU energy directives, and so do the policy 
recommendations proposed by the authors.     
 
The contribution by Gianfreda, Parisio and Pelagatti (2016) on the other hand asks 
whether the long-run relationship between fossil fuel prices and electricity prices 
needs to be revisited as a result of the effect of increased penetration of generation 
from renewable sources and increased integration of energy markets in the 
European Union. The results of their analysis reveal that despite the attempts to 
promote the integration of European energy markets through increased 
interconnection and market coupling price dispersion across Member States has 
been fully eliminated. Furthermore the increased penetration of generation 
technology from renewable sources in the last few years has affected the 
relationship between input (mainly coal and gas) prices and electricity prices, a 
relationship which was promoting price convergences across the different European 
markets. More specifically the empirical results of Gianfreda, Parisio and Pelagatti 
indicate that in recent year the influence of fuel prices on electricity prices has 
significantly diminished and that the increases RES-E penetration can be identified 
as one of the main causes on decreased levels of electricity market integration 
across the EU. They ascribe this phenomenon to overlapping national and supra-
national energy policies which produced conflicting results, such as the increased 
use of coal for electricity generation when this became cheaper than gas, despite the 
political and financial efforts aimed at promoting green generation and a reduction in 
GHG emissions. 
2.3 Issues Related to Transmission, Planning, Congestion and Pricing 
The next set of papers focuses on issues related to transmission planning, network 
pricing and congestion. Kemfert, Kunz and Rosellon (2016) focus on the effect of 
transmission planning on German electricity market. They highlight the role of the 
trade-off between transmission network development and generation dispatch, which 
has important welfare implications for investment decisions about expansion of the 
transmission network. As a result of their analysis they are bale to demonstrate that 
sub-optimal transmission planning, which does not account or the above-mentioned 
trade-off leads to excessive investment by the transmission system operator and to 
welfare reduction as a result of cost inflation. The analysis of the German case is 
particularly interesting as the energy policy in this country has promoted a significant 
expansion in electricity generation from renewable sources. This has created the 
need for expansion and reshaping of the electricity network, however transmission 
planning in Germany does not consider generation dispatch when determining the 
necessary investment in transmission expansion, as this is based on a congestion-
free transmission network. It is the lack of a shadow value for congestion which 
leads to overinvestment as a result of profit maximisation choices by transmission 
system operators. Kemfert et al.’s analysis demonstrates that the optimal level of 
transmission expansion is achieved when the minimum level of congestion is 
coupled with minimum network cost. Their analysis allows them to evaluate the 
extent of overinvestment which is associated with the existing regulatory system. 
Indeed their analysis reveals investment costs at 45% above the optimal levels, as a 
result of the current cost-plus regulation of TSO’s profitability, which does not 
account for generation dispatch and does not rely on nodal prices as signals for 
optimal generation location.  
Optimal price zones also play an important role in determining social welfare as a 
result of energy policy interventions in the work of Grimm, Martin, Weibelzahl and 
Zottl (2016), who assess their potential impact on the liberalised European electricity 
markets. In investigating optimal zonal price configurations the authors highlight the 
importance of capacity constraints, which can limit the positive welfare effects of 
market splitting in the long run. While the introduction of optimal price zones can lead 
to investment in areas with low generation capacity in response to congestion issues, 
this method of addressing congestion can still give rise to overinvestment if technical 
and physical constraints limit the ability to use the transmission capacity, therefore 
leading to reductions in social welfare. The authors highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects of increasing the number of 
price zones. They point out that in the short run this approach is always beneficial as 
it reduces re-dispatch costs, however it is important to consider the long-run effect of 
such policy as a result of the investment incentives it creates. Indeed once capacity 
adjustment is included in the analysis of the effect of zonal prices and increased 
refinement of price zones does not necessarily improve welfare. While the authors 
do not conclude that market splitting should always be considered undesirable, their 
analysis leads them to recommend that detailed consideration should be given to the 
development of price zones in European markets, taking into account the potential 
long run effects and investment incentives. This recommendation is particularly 
important for those countries with a level of interconnection with neighbouring 
countries.  
2.4 The European Natural Gas Market 
Two of the contributions to this special issue focus on the challenges currently faced 
in the European gas market. The gas industry has been for a long time the focus of 
concerns regarding security of supply in the European Union as a result of 
geopolitical uncertainty at the global level. Egging and Holz (2106) develop a 
stochastic model of the global natural gas market to evaluate investment decisions 
and trade flows in 3 long term scenarios associated with different types of risks: (i) 
potential disruptions of Russian supply (ii) demand changes due to gas intensity of 
electricity generation and (iii) availability of shale gas. Their analysis reveals how 
investment decisions are affected by economic agents’ intertemporal hedging 
behaviour. The authors also find that developments in the global natural gas market 
are predominantly driven by demand-side pull factors (due to increasing gas intensity 
of power generation) rather than supply-side push factors (such as increased 
availability of shale gas). The results of their analysis lead the authors to reach some 
important conclusion about European policy for the gas market. Their scenario 
analysis supports additional reverse flow investment in Europe to mitigate the risk of 
supply disruptions form Russia and EU policies aimed at expanding the continent’s 
LNG import capacity. Their results also confirm the importance of additional 
investment in pipelines such as the Southern Corridor project and the expanded 
interconnection of Poland with neighbouring countries, which are likely to generate 
welfare improvement subject to the efficient use of the European pipeline network, 
which can be achieved through the effective implementation of the European internal 
energy market. 
Hulshof, van der Maat and Mulder (2016) also investigate the European gas market 
by assessing the role of market fundamentals as determinants of the recent 
evolution in natural gas prices. They provide empirical evidence in support of the 
view that recent EU policies have been successful in creating an efficient European 
gas market. On the one hand they recognise the beneficial effects of market 
liberalisation with the emergence of international gas hubs which promote gas to gas 
competition. On the other hand the authors express concerns about the fact that the 
market is still characterised by a limited number of suppliers and limited intensity of 
competition. Their analysis leads the authors to recommend that energy policies 
aimed at increasing gas to gas competition and increasing the level of integration 
across the European gas market should be extended, given the success achieved in 
promoting a liquid international spot market and reducing the influence of oil prices 
(through oil-linked long term contracts) on the process of price formation. These 
policies have relied not only on investment in cross border capacity and the 
elimination of trade barriers but also on an effective capacity allocation and 
congestion management mechanism. 
2.5 Sustainability and Reduced GHG Emissions  
Against the background of policies aimed at facilitating the development of integrated 
European markets for electricity and gas, one of the main drivers of European 
energy policy remains the pursuit of sustainability objectives, among which 
reductions in GHG emissions represents a dominant objective. The increased 
penetration of energy generation from renewable sources has created additional 
challenges in relation to the required adjustment to traditional market arrangements 
and the costs associated with them. 
Pereira da Silva, Moreno and Figueiredo (2016) carry out an empirical assessment 
of the short-run and long-run effects of the prices of CO2 emissions on the stock 
market value of Spanish electricity firms. As discussed earlier the Spanish electricity 
market has been subject to radical transformations in their generation mix with high 
levels of penetration of generation from wind and solar power. Furthermore the EU-
ETS is oldest and largest carbon market in the world and has been considered as an 
importance reference case for the development of other regimes so the analysis of 
this scheme can provide important lessons for policymakers in other parts of the 
world. The authors’ analysis reveals that the stock market impact of variations in 
emission prices is different depending on the EU-ETS phase under consideration 
and on the firm’s generation mix. They also find out that stock market effect can be 
asymmetric, i.e. the size of the effect is different for positive and negative changes in 
emission prices. More specifically in phase II of EU-ETS they observe positive long 
run effects of emissions price variation, with firm specific asymmetric effects. On the 
contrary they do not observe any significant long-run effects in Phase III. 
Furthermore while the effects is phase II affect mostly firms with a fuel mix 
dominated by fossil fuel, only firms with a prevalence of generation from renewable 
sources see a significant impact on their stock market variation. The authors argue 
that the differences between the two phases should be ascribed to difference in the 
initial allowance allocation which has initially favoured fossil fuel generators. The 
results of this work lead to the conclusion that policymakers should be aware of the 
potential stock market implications for companies with different generation mixes 
when devising market design and allowance allocation for the emission trading 
schemes being implemented across the world. 
Böhringer, Bortolamedi, Keller and Seyffarth (2016) highlight the complex nature of 
the current European Union’s emissions control and energy policies, which are 
underpinned by the need for Government intervention in markets in response to the 
market failures associated with climate protection. Several decades of leadership in 
the global climate action have produced a series of overlapping, and at times 
conflicting, objectives and instruments which might hinder effective action on energy 
and climate, and might result in unnecessary costs being borne by society. In order 
to evaluate the extent of these problems the authors carried out a rigorous impact 
assessment of the EU climate and energy policy to examine their effectiveness and 
associated costs. They identify cost-related problems with the implementation of the 
EU-ETS, which covers only energy-intensive industry, while emissions abatement for 
other economic sectors is pursued through national regulation. The lack of formal 
linkages between ETS and non-ETS sectors of the economies hinders the 
achievement of emission reductions by equalising marginal abatement costs across 
markets, thus increasing the total cos of abatement. Further sources of excess costs 
are represented by the implementation of policies which support the development of 
renewable technologies and energy efficiency measures which are not explicitly 
coordinated with the emission trading scheme. The authors’ analysis reveals that 
regulations on energy efficiency improvements cause a costly deviation from the 
cost-effective abatement patterns which could be achieved by relying stand-alone 
pricing schemes only. They argue that this lacks of cost-effectiveness in EU climate 
and emission abatements policies weaken the potential leading role of the European 
Union in promoting economically viable decarbonisation policies which could be 
adopted in less wealthy areas of the world.  
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